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A Cross-Country Analysis of the 







This paper employs regression analysis in an attempt to identify the factors that 
impact on the coverage of highly active antiretroviral treatment (HAART) and 
mother-to-child transmission prevention (MTCTP) in different countries. Both 
HAART and MTCTP are based on the administration of antiretroviral drugs and 
constitute an integral part of a successful response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Governments play an important role in determining the level of HAART and 
MTCTP coverage in a country.  
  
Ordinary least squares estimation reveals that the concentration of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in urban areas and the share of GDP a country spends on 
health care have a positive impact on HAART coverage and that the incident of 
health crises other than AIDS negatively impacts on MTCTP coverage. A high 
HIV prevalence rate and a high influx of international aid are associated with 
higher levels of HAART and MTCTP coverage. There are significant regional 
differences in HAART and MTCTP coverage even after the effects of several 





There has been a significant decline in the price of antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) 
since they first became widely available in the developed world in the mid 
1990s (Ford et al, 2007). This, together with the availability of international 
HIV/AIDS-related aid, puts ARVs within financial reach of developing 
countries. Yet countries have succeeded to very different degrees in ‘rolling’ out 
antiretrovirals to those who need them. By employing the statistical tools of 
regression analysis this paper seeks to identify the potential determinants of 
cross-country performance with regard to providing ARVs for HIV prevention 
and treatment.  
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The dependent variables under investigation are the coverage of highly active 
antiretroviral treatment (HAART) in 2006 and the coverage of mother-to-child 
transmission prevention (MTCTP) in 2005.1 ARV coverage, whether for 
HAART or MTCTP, is defined as the number of people receiving ARVs as a 
percentage of those who need them.  In 2006, approximately 2 million of the 
estimated 7.1 million people in developing countries in need of HAART 
received treatment (WHO 2007:15); in 2005, 220 000 of the estimated 2 million 
women in need of MTCTP received antiretroviral prophylaxis (ibid:31). Table 1 
and Figure 1 illustrate the divergence of both HAART and MTCTP coverage in 
different regions and countries. It is evident that some regions and countries 
have been considerably more successful than others in achieving high ARV 
coverage.   
 
 
Table 1: HAART and MTCTP coverage in different regions of the world 
Region HAART coverage (2006) MTCTP coverage (2005)
Sub-Saharan Africa 28% 11%
Latin America and the Caribbean 72% 24%
East. South, and South-East Asia 19% 50%
Europe and Central Asia 15% 75%
North Africa and Middle East 60% 10%
Total 28% 11%  
Source: WHO (2007) 
 
Regression analysis can determine the extent to which the variation in ARV 
coverage across countries can be ‘explained’ by the variation in a set of 
explanatory variables. I run ordinary least square regressions of HAART 
coverage and MTCTP coverage on respective sets of explanatory variables. 
Following Nattrass (2006), regressions are run over a sample of countries with 
adult HIV prevalence rates of 0.1% or above. The countries that constitute this 
sample are displayed in Figure 1.    
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate that HAART coverage and MTCTP coverage do 
not always vary together and hence may be driven by different factors. It is thus 
a good idea to run separate regressions on these two different forms of ARV 
coverage. To my knowledge this paper is the first attempt to investigate the 
determinants of MTCTP coverage using cross-country regressions. Results from 
these regressions are relevant and interesting in their own right. Furthermore, by 
comparing the results of HAART and MTCTP regressions, the analysis enables 
                                                 
1 HAART coverage for December 2006 and MTCTP coverage for 2005 were obtained from 
the UNAIDS/WHO Global HIV Data Base: http://www.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/default.asp. 
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us to reflect more broadly on potentially different policy approaches to these two 
ARV-based interventions.  
 
The next section explores the pivotal role countries’ governments play in rolling 
out ARVs. Section 3 looks at important quantitative empirical studies concerned 
with the measurement of political will and government commitment, and the 
impact of these variables on ARV coverage and other AIDS-related policy 
outcomes. Section 4 describes the variables that constitute my empirical model. 
Section 5 discusses the statistical problem of endogeneigty. Section 6 presents 
the results of the regression analysis and Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. The role of government in rolling out ARVs 
 
Governments play a crucial role in the provision of ARVs. In the absence of free 
or at least subsidized government provision of ARVs, the majority of people in 
need in developing countries simply cannot afford it. Therefore any large scale 
ARV intervention in developing countries necessarily has to be financed through 
either public funds or international aid. On average, only 25% of all spending on 
HIV constitutes out-of-pocket spending by households, but the percentage varies 
greatly from country to country (UNAIDS 2006: 232).  
 
The importance of government and international organizations implies that 
simple economic modeling of ARV coverage based on profit-maximizing firms 
and utility-maximizing consumers would be inappropriate. Without a readily 
available (economic) theoretical model to identify testable hypotheses, we need 
to build up a set of plausible hypotheses from scratch. It is therefore important to 
understand how governments affect ARV coverage.    
 
Developing country governments can affect the price and hence the availability 
of ARVs for their citizens by issuing compulsory licenses to produce or import 
generic equivalents of patented drugs, or by threatening to do so. This is a tactic 
which Brazil has used successfully to negotiate lower ARV prices from the large 
pharmaceutical companies (Ford et al 2007). The supply of ARVs to citizens 
also depends on the presence of an adequate health infrastructure and qualified 
health personnel to administer the therapy. Accordingly, the lack or poor quality 
of health infrastructure and human capital in some countries has been identified 
as a major obstacle to rolling out ARVs (e.g. Hosseinipour et al 2002; UNAIDS 
2006, Global Fund 2007).  
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Figure 1. HAART and MTCTP coverage in different countries 
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Whether a person will seek MTCTP or HAART is not only contingent on the 
economic costs associated with it. It also depends on social factors such as fear 
of stigma. Government pronouncements on HIV and its marketing of HIV 
testing and AIDS treatment services will thus affect the numbers of people 
seeking and obtaining the necessary ARV treatment. In other words, political 
will and commitment on behalf of government leaders is crucial as it affects 
both the supply of services and the social environment structuring the demand 
for them. As Bor puts it:  
 
“Not only does political commitment generate policy responses; 
through frank and open discourse, political leaders can help educate 
the public, alleviate stigma, and generate an environment conductive 
to civil society initiatives and, ultimately, behavioral change.” (2007: 
1587) 
 
A government’s ability and commitment to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic is 
influenced by a number of political and economic considerations. First and 
foremost, a government is constrained by the availability of resources. 
Furthermore, a government’s commitment to fighting the epidemic is likely to 
be influenced by the people in need of ARVs and those involved in supplying it. 
Influence is exerted through lobbying, legal action, or the democratic process.  
 
In Brazil, for instance, the mobilization of civil society and the pressure this 
applied to the national government has been attributed a crucial role in achieving 
universal HAART rollout (Levi & Vitoria 2002; Oliveira-Cruz, Kowalsky & 
McPake 2004). In South Africa, people in need of ARVs have seen a decrease in 
drug prices and the provision of ARVs for both MTCTP and HAART as the 
direct result of the Treatment Action Campaign (an NGO of AIDS activists) 
taking on the government in a social disobedience campaign and in the country’s 
legal courts (Iliffe 2006; Nattrass 2007). In many cases, however, the impact of 
such pressure from civil society on government is likely to be more subtle than 
in the Brazilian and South African examples.  
 
Besides political and economic considerations a government’s response to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic also depends on its beliefs or subjective knowledge. For 
instance, if government doubts the effectiveness of using ARVs to combat the 
epidemic it is likely to commit fewer resources to MTCTP or HAART than to 
other interventions. If for whatever reason influential government officials doubt 
the scientific knowledge underpinning the use of ARVs, this is likely to impact 
negatively on government’s commitment to a treatment intervention (for an 
example from South Africa see Nattrass (2007) and Mauchline (2008)).  
Governments may also be reluctant to rollout ARVs if they think the 
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demographic impact is uncertain (Nattrass 2007). Such subtle differences in 
reasoning are impossible to capture using quantitative analysis. The best we can 
do is to try and measure the broader, more amorphous, notion of ‘political will’ 
to use ARVs.  
 
 
3. Modeling political will 
 
If one wishes to model political will or government commitment explicitly, it is 
necessary to find a good measure of the variable and include it in one’s set of 
explanatory variables. Of course, the success of such a strategy depends 
fundamentally on the existence of an adequate measure of, or proxy for, political 
will. 
 
Bor (2007) uses the political support score of the AIDS Program Effort Index 
(API) to capture political commitment with respect to AIDS which he 
conceptualizes as “the extent to which top-level government leaders support 
AIDS as a priority on the national agenda.” (Bor: 1586). The API political 
support scores are constructed on the basis of objective events such as the 
existence of a national coordinating committee for AIDS programs and whether 
AIDS has been declared a national disaster, and a set of subjective rankings by 
respondents from government, academia, civil society, donor organizations and 
the private sector (API 2003).  
 
Nattrass (2006) argues that the index is an inadequate measure of political 
commitment with respect to HAART rollout because of its subjective nature; 
because HAART rollout does not feature specifically as an issue in the 
construction of the index; and because some of the respondents may have an 
incentive to exaggerate their government’s performance (most obviously, 
government officials themselves). The index’s subjective nature may be 
reflected in the fact that less than ten percent of countries (a suspiciously small 
proportion) saw their political support scores decline between 2001 and 2003. In 
light of this criticism and the fact that using the API political support scores as 
an explanatory variable would decrease my sample size by up to 30 
observations, I do not include the API in my empirical model.  
 
Bor (2007) uses the API political support score as his dependent variable in a 
regression analysis that seeks to uncover the determinants of political 
commitment. He finds press freedom, political stability, foreign investment and 
income inequality to be important predictors of the API. Despite the criticism 
relating to Bor’s dependent variable, I check how three of his explanatory 
variables relating to the political institutions in a country (i.e. electoral 
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accountability, press freedom and political stability) fare as predictors of real 
policy outcomes such as HAART and MTCTP coverage. 
 
Lieberman (2007) also uses regression analysis to investigate the determinants 
of political commitment to fight the AIDS pandemic. His argument is chiefly 
concerned with one of his explanatory variables, cultural fractionalization. One 
of the dependent variables employed by Lieberman is the number of times 
HIV/AIDS received a mention in a country’s budget speech. I am, however, 
suspicious of whether this variable constitutes a good proxy for government 
commitment. First, the variable does not account for the context in which 
HIV/AIDS was mentioned in any particular budget speech. Thus it is impossible 
to tell whether the Finance Minister is mentioning the need for HIV/AIDS 
prevention messaging rather than rolling out ARVs, or discussing the 
government’s commitment to providing ARVs. Second, politicians (including 
ministers of finance) may well be amongst the occupational groups whose 
rhetoric deserves the least trust.   
 
Lieberman also uses a harder measure of political will, namely AIDS-related 
expenditure. While this may in fact capture political will very well, it cannot be 
included in my analysis. AIDS-related expenditure is itself a function of 
HAART and MTCTP coverage. In fact, the extent to which a country is rolling 
out ARVs may be the main determinant of AIDS-related expenditure. This bi-
directional causal relationship leads to the statistical problem of endogeneigty 
(discussed further in Section 5). However, I include the cultural fractionalization 
variable of Lieberman’s analysis in my set of explanatory variables. 
 
In the absence of adequate measures of political will or government 
commitment one may be forced to simply render political will an omitted 
variable. Nattrass (2006) and AIDS Accountability International (2007) derive a 
measure of political will from the regression residual based on the premise that 
political will is in fact an omitted variable in regressions that have HAART as 
their dependent variable. Their logic is as follows. Run a regression controlling 
for factors which affect ARV coverage – but which government cannot be 
expected to influence in the short-term. The slope coefficients of the regression 
will pick up variation in the dependent variable which is not related to policy 
decisions with regard to providing ARVs. The variation in the dependent 
variable that is not explained as linear combinations of the explanatory variables 
gets picked up by the error term. Amongst other things, this residual variation in 
the error term contains some of the effect of omitted variables on the dependent 
variable. Therefore, if political will is the (only) important omitted variable in a 
HAART regression it may be synonymous with most of the variation in the error 
term. As a result, the error term of a regression of HAART coverage on a 
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comprehensive set of explanatory variables (excluding political will) may serve 
as a crude measure of political will. 
 
The approach followed by Nattrass and AIDS Accountability International is 
problematic for a number of reasons. First, it presupposes enormous faith in the 
validity of the HAART regression’s specification, since in the presence of a 
second important omitted variable the error term is no longer a valid measure of 
political will. Second, if political will, the omitted variable, is a function of an 
explanatory variable in the regression, this explanatory variable’s slope 
coefficient captures some of the impact of political will on the dependent 
variable. The measure of political will that is captured in the error term may 
therefore only be a rather incomplete measure of the true political will. Third, a 
regression’s error term also captures all the measurement error in the 
explanatory variables and all other noise in the data. Nattrass and AIDS 
Accountability International make the implicit claim that political will (or the 
share of political will that is not captured in the explanatory variables) 
dominates the other omitted variables, measurement error and noise that make 
up the error term. I am not comfortable making the same assumption and I 
therefore do not attempt to model political will in this way. 
 
There are multiple observable and quantifiable economic, demographic and 
political variables that can be expected to have an effect on a government’s 
commitment to fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic and its ability to pursue a 
MTCTP or HAART rollout. I attempt to capture some aspects of political will 
and government commitment through these variables.  
 
 
4. The empirical model 
 
 
4.1 Dependent variables 
 
The dependent variables in my analysis are HAART and MTCTP coverage. I 
take the natural logs of these variables, which is a monotonic transformation that 
compresses higher values more than lower ones. This has the dual purpose of 
negating the effect of high coverage outliers and accounting for the plausible 
hypothesis that the initial rollout (i.e. at low levels of coverage) is more 
challenging than the expansion of coverage at higher levels. Furthermore, using 
the logs of the dependent variables has the convenient effect of rendering the 
slope coefficients interpretable as partial elasticities (or elasticities, if the 
explanatory variable is logged too).  
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Although HAART and MTCTP are both based on the intake of ARVs they are 
different with respect to analytically relevant features. Most notably, MTCTP is 
a short-term prevention intervention, and HAART is a long-term treatment 
intervention. Also, governments may prioritize MTCTP over HAART for 
reasons of cost-effectiveness and moral judgment (it is easier to argue to save 
the lives of innocent babies than to extend the lives of those who may be blamed 
for becoming infected through their own behavior). However, to the extent that 
HIV-positive groups can mobilize a broader constituency around HAART, this 
political dimension may be negated by civil society organization.    
 
 
4.2 Independent variables 
 
4.2.1 Demographic variables 
 
Adult HIV prevalence rate 
 
The HIV prevalence in a country is likely to impact on ARV coverage in a 
number of ways. To begin with, a higher HIV prevalence is associated with a 
higher demand for ARVs both for MTCTP and HAART. Holding other things 
equal, a higher demand is likely to result in more democratic pressure to roll out 
ARVs being exerted by civil society on government. Furthermore, in a high 
prevalence country, the epidemic is more likely to be in the public eye than in a 
low prevalence country and therefore, at least theoretically, HIV may be more 
likely to constitute a national priority in a high prevalence country.     
 
On the other hand, governments faced with high HIV prevalence in the 
population will obviously find it more expensive and challenging to provide 
ARVs to all who need them. In a cross-country regression, Nattrass (2006) finds 
a negative association between prevalence and HAART coverage as of June 
2004. She attributes this to the greater challenge faced by high prevalence 
countries. However, arguably because of the financial and technical assistance 
by international donors given to high prevalence countries in particular, Nattrass 
finds no significant relationship between prevalence and HAART coverage 
when using more recent data. 
    
Because concentrated epidemics tend to go hand in hand with relatively low 
national prevalence rates, whereas generalized heterosexual epidemics are 
associated with high prevalence rates, prevalence may also constitute a proxy for 
whether a particular country is facing a concentrated or a generalized epidemic. 
Governments may find concentrated epidemics easier to target. And people in 
need of treatment who are socially or spatially concentrated may find it easier to 
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organize and effectively lobby government for treatment. Therefore, to the 
extent to which lower prevalence is associated with higher concentration, this 
may well impact positively on treatment coverage. On the other hand, if there is 
a high concentration of the epidemic amongst risk groups that do not wield 
much political influence (or who are stigmatized, like injecting drug users), 
government may find it politically convenient to sideline these groups.   
 
I use the adult HIV prevalence rate from 2005, which is the prevalence rate 
amongst people aged between 15 and 49. The variable is logged to reduce the 
effect of outliers and because, as Bor (2007) points out, it is theoretically 
plausible that a change in prevalence from 1% to 2% is far more politically 
significant than a change from say 24% to 25%.   
 
The proportion of HIV positive people in urban areas 
 
Nattrass (2006) finds that the concentration of HIV/AIDS epidemics in urban 
areas, as proxied for by the differential between urban and rural HIV prevalence 
rates, has a positive effect on HAART rollout. I include the proportion of HIV 
positive people in urban areas as an explanatory variable in the regression 
analysis as an attempt to capture the additional pressure exerted on government 
if people in the need of ARVs are concentrated in urban areas. Furthermore, the 
variable may also capture the fact that it is easier to roll out ARVs in cities as 
opposed to rural areas because of the concentration of patients and health care 
professionals in one place. On average, more than 75 percent of doctors are 
located in urban areas (Dal Poz et al 2006:10).   
 
4.2.2. Economic variables 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
 
It is intuitive that a richer country is more likely to engage in a generally costly 
treatment intervention. A higher income per capita positively impacts on the 
private provision of ARVs as people in need of treatment are more likely to 
afford it. Furthermore, because government budgets tend to be roughly 
proportional to national income, a higher income also positively impacts on the 
public provision of ARVs. Highly correlated with a country’s income and 
wealth is a country’s health infrastructure which, if of a high quality, is likely to 
decrease the cost and increase the feasibility of a government-lead treatment 
intervention. 
  
It is important to note that committing scarce government resources to rolling 
out ARVs comes at a substantial opportunity cost. Although governments can 
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save money by providing ARVs – in that fewer AIDS-related opportunistic 
infections occur as a result of MTCTP and HAART (see Levi and Vitoria (2002) 
for Brazil and Nattrass and Geffen (2005) for South Africa) – the short-term 
direct costs of rolling out ARVs could reduce the share of a government budget 
going to other areas, e.g. education or combating other diseases. In other words, 
it is not only the money at a government’s disposal that matters, but also what 
urgent problems are competing for a share of this money.   
 
I use the log of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) from 2005 as a 
measure of a country’s income. GDP per capita is logged to diminish the effect 
of high income outliers. Furthermore, because a logged GDP per capita variable 
attaches relatively more weight to changes in income at low levels, it takes into 
account that low income countries face a dual burden: low income; and the high 
opportunity cost of spending on ARVs due to their low level of development. 
 
The share of GDP spent on health 
 
The share of a country’s total expenditure allocated to health reveals how much 
a society values health care over alternative uses of income. We would thus 
expect a positive relationship between the share of GDP spent on health and 
ARV coverage (for both MTCTP and HAART). However, there may also be an 
element of opportunity cost inherent in this variable as it captures expenditure 
on all health issues faced by a country. If a relatively high expenditure on health 
as a percentage of GDP indicates the presence of other health crises competing 
with the HIV/AIDS pandemic for scarce resources, then we would expect this 
variable to have a negative relationship with ARV coverage. I use data from 




In many countries international donors and non-governmental organizations 
provide the funding that constitutes a necessary condition for a national rollout 
of MTCTP or HAART. The United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
relief (PEPFAR) probably accounted for 75% of total AIDS-related bilateral aid 
in 2007 (UNAIDS 2006: 238). Two thirds of the PEPFAR money is allocated to 
15 focus countries (12 of them African) and fifty-five percent of these funds are 
spent on HAART (UNAIDS 2006: 238). The Global Fund for HIV, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria is the largest multilateral fund for HIV-related policy 
support. Fifty-six percent of the Fund’s money is spent on HIV (mainly 
treatment initiatives) and 60% of the Fund’s commitments go to sub-Saharan 
Africa (UNAIDS 2006: 242; Global Fund 2007).  
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I construct a variable measuring the PEPFAR dollars received by a country 
divided by its population. I also calculate the Global Fund’s HIV-related grants 
per capita received by a country.2 Unfortunately, the data does not allow for a 
finer dissection of the aid money, whereby the share of the funds that goes 
towards treatment could be determined.  
 
4.2.3 Health infrastructure 
 
The percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel 
 
Good infrastructure and human capital in the health sector are likely to increase 
the speed of a MTCTP or HAART rollout and, by making any such rollout 
feasible, they may also impact positively on the government’s initial decision to 
undertake the intervention. Of course, the private provision of ARVs is also 
positively affected by the availability of health services.  
 
The percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel captures the 
coverage of a country’s health system and therefore the extent to which health 
infrastructure and human resources are available to the people.3 Skilled health 
personnel may also impact on an ARV rollout directly. Iliffe (2006) points out 
the pivotal role played by doctors and nurses in lobbying for HIV-related 
government initiatives. They do so as advocates for their patients, but also for 
themselves as they comprise a group which is highly exposed to the risk of 
infection.   
 
                                                 
2 The PEPFAR variable is constructed from a dataset that can be downloaded from the Center for Global 
Development’s webpage: http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/hivmonitor/pepfardata; the 
Global Fund variable is constructed from disbursement data that can be downloaded from the Global 
Fund’s webpage: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/funds_raised/commitments.  
3 There exists data on the number of doctors in a country, which may represent a better measure of 
human capital in the health sector. However, this data is sporadic and uneven (most countries have only 
one data point) and the date of collection varies significantly across regions. For example, the average 
date of collection in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is 2006, for Sub-Saharan Africa, 2004, and for 
Latin America and the Caribbean it is 2000. The date of collection also varies for the births attended by 
skilled health personnel data, but it does not vary systematically across regions. 
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The set of explanatory variables contains a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a country is an established democracy and 0 if it is not.4 If a country is an 
established democracy its government is likely to be more responsive to the 
demands of its citizens because civil society can impose its demands on 
government through the democratic process. Therefore, democracy is likely to 




In an effort to explain why being an African country seems to have a negative 
effect on economic growth in many empirical studies, Englebert (2000) 
develops the concept of state legitimacy. Low state legitimacy is found in 
countries in which state creation was exogenous and the domestic political 
leadership inherited its rule from the colonizers rather than shaping it itself. 
According to Englebert most African states  
 
“…were born lacking legitimacy in the sense that they were not 
endogenous to their societies, that they were not historically 
embedded into domestic relations of power and domination and that 
they therefore suffered from a dichotomization between power and 
statehood.” (Englebert, 2000: 1823) 
 
As a result of low state legitimacy, some postcolonial states may derive greater 
power payoffs from neo-patrimonial than from developmental policy choices. 
Englebert argues that developmental policies require some degree of loyalty on 
behalf of bureaucrats and trust in a country’s institutions on behalf of civil 
society that are unlikely to exist in the absence of state legitimacy. Then, leaders 
may find it worthwhile to replace developmental with neo-patrimonial policy 
choices by, for example, substituting for the ‘moral right to rule’ with ‘patron-
client links’ (ibid: 824). 
 
It may be argued that a broadly based rollout of ARVs for MTCTP and HAART 
is more compatible with developmental policy choices than with a neo-
patrimonial leadership strategy. It is of course possible that in some cases a low-
income country could decide that developmental goals are best pursued by 
putting the marginal dollar into education rather than ARVs. However, holding 
                                                 
4 This variable was sourced from Smith (2003).  
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other things equal, it is reasonable to suppose that a state pursuing 
developmental policies is likely to opt for ARV-based interventions before a 
state that has adopted a neo-patrimonial leadership style. A neo-patrimonial 
strategy implies the state’s focus on the interests of a few strongmen or 
concentrated powerful groups. At least in generalised epidemics this narrow 
policy focus probably contradicts any widespread ARV-based intervention. 
 
Given the link between state legitimacy and neo-patrimony, state legitimacy 
may be a predictor of MTCTP and HAART coverage. Table 2 illustrates 
Englebert’s construction of a dummy variable that divides countries into 
legitimate and non-legitimate states.  
 
Table 2: Construction of the state legitimacy dummy 
Legitimate (=1) Non-legitimate (=0)
1) Was the country colonized in modern times? No Yes (go to question 2)
2) When reaching independence, did the country Yes No (go to question3)
recover its previous sovereignty, identity or
effective existence?
3) If the country was created by colonialism, was No Yes (go to question 4)
there a human settlement pre-dating
colonization?
4) Did the colonizers (and/or their imported Yes No (go to question 5)
slaves) reduce the pre-existing societies to
numerical insignificance (or assimilate them)
and become the citizens of the new country?
5) Does the post-colonial state do severe violence No Yes
to pre-existing political institutions?
Source: Englebert (2000) 
 
 
Electoral accountability, freedom of the press and political stability 
 
Bor (2007) argues that there exists a relationship between electoral 
accountability and freedom of the press and the political commitment to fighting 
the AIDS pandemic. Sen (1999) provides the rationale for this relationship by 
arguing that by exposing crisis conditions, a free press together with electoral 
accountability, can help generate inescapable incentives for leaders to intervene. 
In a cross-country regression, Bor (2007) finds that freedom of press is indeed a 
significant determinant of his measure of political commitment. I use the 
updated versions of the variables used by Bor (electoral accountability and press 
freedom) to check whether they have any explanatory power over HAART and 
MTCTP coverage. As a measure for electoral accountability I use the Freedom 
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House ‘Political Rights’ Score from 2003 and as a measure of press freedom I 
use the Freedom House ‘Freedom of the Press’ Score from 2006. 
 
Bor also finds political stability to be an important predictor of a country’s 
commitment to fight the AIDS pandemic. He uses the World Bank’s indicator 
for ‘political stability’ which measures the threat of extra-legal challenges to the 
state. Bor argues that the increased risk of a regime collapse has leaders discount 
the benefits of a robust response to AIDS. I include the World Bank’s political 




Lieberman (2007) argues that cultural fractionalization in a country is likely to 
have a negative impact on a government’s policy response to the AIDS 
pandemic. He hypothesizes that elites in culturally fractionalized countries are 
less likely to mobilize openly against a stigmatized disease for the fear of 
reputational damages. Lieberman argues that as a result of cultural 
fractionalization, political elites may also be more likely to allege that the risk is 
contained in other ethnic groups or that the threat is exaggerated.  
 
Lieberman tests his hypothesis empirically using a cultural fractionalization 
index developed by Fearon (2003). According to Lieberman, Fearon’s index is 
superior to competing measures of ethnic fractionalization because it explicitly 
puts weight on the social and political salience of ethnic dissimilarities and 
achieves a wide geographic coverage. In a regression analysis, Lieberman finds 
the index to be negatively related to a number of AIDS-related policy measures 
including HAART coverage (controlling for HIV prevalence, GDP per capita, 
government effectiveness, public health expenditure over GDP, whether a 
country is a democracy, whether a country is in Africa and whether a country is 
in Latin America or the Caribbean). I include the index of cultural 
fractionalization used by Lieberman in my set of explanatory variables. 
 
4.2.5 Regional dummy variables 
 
Table 1 indicates that there are large differences in ARV coverage across 
regions. I enter dummy variables for ‘Latin America and the Caribbean’, 
‘Eastern Europe and Central Asia’ and ‘East, South and South-East Asia’. Sub-
Saharan Africa functions as the base. Since there are only two countries from 
North Africa and the Middle East in the sample, no dummy variable is included 
for this region.  
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Ideally, the other explanatory variables, which possess a concrete theoretical 
link to ARV coverage, should pick up inter-regional variation in coverage. If the 
set of explanatory variables fails to account for the differences in coverage 
across regions, a significant regional dummy variable will indicate that there is 
an important omitted variable that is related to a particular region. The countries 
in a region may share demographic, cultural and political characteristics. These 
characteristics may hold some significant determinants of ARV coverage.  
 
Countries in southern Africa have experienced generalized heterosexual 
epidemics to an extent that no other region has seen (Iliffe 2006; Barnett and 
Whiteside 2002). I construct a dummy that takes the value of 1 for countries 
with an adult HIV prevalence rate above 15 percent. This ‘Southern Africa mega 
epidemics’ dummy may capture the impact of generalized epidemics on MTCTP 
and HAART coverage to the extent to which this is not already captured in the 
prevalence rate. 
 
4.2.6 Disability Adjusted Life Years lost (DALYs) per capita 
due to non-AIDS related reasons  
 
I follow AIDS Accountability International (2007) in including in my analysis 
the DALYs due to non-AIDS related reasons as a measure of other health 
demands in a country. The DALYs of a disease are the sum of the years of life 
lost due to premature mortality and years of healthy life lost due to disability 
incident cases of the health condition or disease (WHO 2008).   
 
The DALYs due to non-AIDS related reasons are the years of healthy life lost 
due to all diseases other than AIDS. The non-AIDS DALYs should thus capture 
the extent to which other diseases or medical conditions compete with AIDS for 
a share of private and public health budgets. They are therefore an explicit 
measure of the opportunity cost in terms of health of a dollar from the health 
budget spent on ARVs. By including this variable in the set of explanatory 
variables, it is hoped that the element of opportunity cost inherent in other 
explanatory variables such as ‘GDP spent on health’ is captured. I log the non-
AIDS DAILYs per capita to negate the effect of outliers. The data for this 
variable is from 2002. 
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5. The problem of endogeneigty 
 
 
5.1 The potentially endogenous variables 
 
Endogeneigty arises when explanatory variables are correlated with the 
regression’s error term. Endogenous variables result in biased and inconsistent 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators. The bias means that the estimated slope 
coefficients are different from their ‘true’ values and the inconsistency entails 
that the problem persists in large samples. Possible causes of endogeneigty are 
measurement error, bi-directional causality between HAART or MTCTP and an 
explanatory variable, and the existence of omitted variables that is correlated to 
an explanatory variable in the regression. If endogeneigty were indeed a 
problem in the regression models that follow the most likely culprits would be 
the HIV prevalence rate, the share of GDP spent on health, and the percentage of 
births attended by skilled health personnel.  
 
HIV prevalence rates are notoriously hard to estimate and may thus contain a 
measurement error (for a critique of the accuracy of prevalence data see Chin 
2007). The variable may also be correlated with an omitted variable such as 
political will. Furthermore, there may also exist a bidirectional causal 
relationship with the dependent variable. More specifically, HIV prevalence 
may be a function of HAART coverage because HAART increases the life 
expectancy of those who receive it. As people with HIV live longer in the 
presence of an effective rollout of HAART, prevalence increases. MTCTP, on 
the other hand, has a negative effect on prevalence. More specifically, MTCTP 
has been shown to reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV by up to 40% 
(Jackson et al., 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the HIV prevalence rate is not endogenous. 
Endogeneigty is a statistical phenomenon that is blind to theory and interested 
only in the values particular data take. And some of the effects mentioned above 
may exert their influence in opposite directions. Furthermore, in most countries 
the rollout of HAART may not yet have had sufficient time to substantially 
impact on the life expectancy of the people receiving treatment. To illustrate 
this, between 2001 and 2005 the number of people receiving HAART in 
developing countries increased fivefold from 240 000 to approximately 1.3 
million (UNAIDS 2006:151) and the estimated total number of people infected 
with HIV in the world was 38.8 million in 2006 (UNAIDS 2006:8). 
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The share of GDP spent on health care may also be correlated with the error 
term because of a bidirectional causal relationship with HAART and MTCTP 
coverage. It is plausible that as people and governments have to pay for costly 
ARVs they are forced to spend less money on other items in their budgets 
thereby increasing the share of GDP spent on health. What speaks against this 
form of endogeneigty is that those countries that have achieved high ARV 
coverage have not necessarily experienced growth in their share of GDP spent 
on health between 2000 and 2004. This is reflected in the fact that the pairwise 
correlation coefficient for the difference in the share of GDP spent on health 
between 2004 and 2000 and HAART coverage is only 0.086. 
 
An extensive rollout of ARVs may require that a country actively seeks to 
increase the number of health professionals within its borders. HAART and 
MTCTP may hence exert a positive effect on the percentage of births attended 
by skilled health personnel thereby rendering this variable endogenous. 
However, because the bulk of the data for this variable predates 2002 it is 
possible that efforts to roll out ARVs have not yet had enough time to 
significantly impact on this variable. 
 
 
5.2 Testing for endogeneigty 
 
A method frequently used to deal with the problem of endogeneigty is 
instrumental variable estimation. This technique employs an instrumental 
variable which, in simple terms, is used to ‘stand in’ for the endogenous 
explanatory variable. The instrumental variable needs to be valid and not too 
weak. An instrument is said to be strong and not weak if its correlation with the 
endogenous variable is high. It is valid if it is not itself correlated with the error 
term of the original regression. Amongst other things, this implies that an 
instrument cannot also be a significant determinant of the dependent variable. 
 
The Hausman specification test by means of artificial regression allows us to test 
for endogeneigty based on the logic of instrumental variable estimation. The 
procedure is as follows: First, run a regression of the potentially endogenous 
variable on a suitable instrumental variable and all the other explanatory 
variables. Then, run a second regression of the dependent variable on all the 
explanatory variables (including the potentially endogenous variable) and the 
error term of the first-stage regression. If the first-stage error term has a 
significant coefficient in the second-stage regression, endogeneigty is likely to 
be a problem. Because there are three potentially endogenous variables in my set 
of explanatory variables, three first stage regressions need to be run. Their three 
error terms are then included in the second stage regression. 
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I use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country is predominantly 
Muslim as an instrument for the adult HIV prevalence rate. In a cross-country 
regression, Nattrass (2008) finds that this variable has a significant negative 
effect on HIV prevalence. Since we are dealing with a disease that is most 
commonly transmitted sexually, it is plausible that a religion that imposes strict 
rules on sexual intercourse (rules that tend to limit sexual freedom, especially of 
women) has a dampening effect on prevalence. With respect to the instrument’s 
validity, there is no reason to expect the Muslim variable to be related to ARV 
coverage.  
 
The share of private expenditure on health financed by prepaid plans functions 
as the instrument for the share of GDP spent on health care. The share of prepaid 
plans measures the extent to which people in a particular country have access to 
private medical insurance. The availability of medical insurance is likely to be 
based mainly on the country’s level of development and the quality of its 
institutions. People are risk averse. So if medical insurance is available they are 
likely to buy it. Furthermore, on average we expect people to spend more money 
on health if they have the chance to indulge their risk aversion. Therefore, 
holding other things equal, a higher coverage of private medical insurance is 
likely to be associated with a larger share of GDP being spent on health. The 
most likely source of invalidity for this instrument would be that prepaid plans 
also determine HAART or MTCTP coverage. However, I know of no incident in 
any of the countries included in the sample where the presence of private 
medical insurers has made a difference in the provision of ARVs.  
 
I instrument the percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel with a 
country’s adult literacy rate. The argument is straight forward. The number of 
skilled health personnel in a country is a function of that country’s education 
system’s ability to produce them; and a country’s adult literacy rate proxies for 
the quality of the education system. It may be argued that invalidity cannot be 
precluded because it is possible that the literacy rate has an impact on ARV 
coverage. However, it is by no means clear that there is a relationship between 
the level of education in a country and the social beliefs held with regards to 
AIDS and its treatment. 
 
Table 3 contains the Hausman test for all three potentially endogenous variables 
in both the HAART and the MTCTP regressions. The diagnosis is that none of 






Table 3: Hausman specification tests by means of artificial regression 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable: 
Predominantly Muslim -1.01 *** -0.87 ***
0.29 0.29
0.0319 *** 0.0343 *
0.0107 0.0175
Adult literacy rate 0.50 *** 0.41 **
0.16 0.16
Log of adult HIV prevalence 0.30 -1.45 0.70 -3.25
0.28 1.62 0.43 2.32
0.52 -0.13 0.25 0.58 -0.56 1.70
0.44 0.77 6.49 0.57 1.10 8.99
Log of GDP per capita 0.15 -0.19 13.10 *** 0.04 -0.41 14.68 ***
0.25 0.65 3.04 0.26 0.91 3.63
0.08 0.56 0.13 *** 1.67
0.06 0.89 0.05 1.10
-0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
PEPFAR dollars per capita 0.00 *** 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03
Global Fund (HIV) dollars per capita 0.07 ** 0.01 0.15 0.06 ** 0.00 0.04
0.03 0.04 0.25 0.02 0.04 0.29
Established democracy 0.06 -0.05 4.56 -0.46 * 0.34 2.63
0.28 0.43 5.70 0.27 0.56 7.88
State legitimacy -0.14 0.61 -4.32 -0.35 0.71 -4.41
0.29 0.41 4.48 0.33 0.65 5.43
Log of non-AIDS DALYs per capita 1.05 ** -0.42 -6.30 0.37 -0.30 -0.80
0.43 0.86 10.12 0.36 1.12 12.15
Latin America and the Caribbean -0.94 * 0.98 -9.91 -1.02 * 1.90 ** -14.16 *
0.48 0.60 6.87 0.54 0.82 8.36
East, south and South-East Asia -1.01 ** -0.85 -13.19 * -0.83 0.07 -10.40
0.47 0.64 6.95 0.52 0.88 9.41
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -0.76 0.95 1.15 -0.40 1.18 3.43
0.51 0.61 6.40 0.77 0.87 7.73
Southern Africa mega epidemics 1.48 *** -0.06 -2.74 1.49 *** -0.98 4.43
0.41 1.00 6.26 0.41 1.28 6.93
R2 0.70 0.29 0.75 0.77 0.33 0.69
F-statistic 19.29 *** 3.93 *** 18.89 *** 15.35 *** 3.78 *** 17.95 ***
Observations (N) 82 82 82 55 55 55
Dependent variable: 
Regression 1 error term 0.09
0.29
Regression 2 error term 0.17
0.15
Regression 3 error term 0.00
0.01
Regression 4 error term -0.59
0.42
Regression 5 error term -0.28
0.22
Regression 6 error term 0.02
0.02
And independent variables from above
R2 0.63 0.80
F-statistic 9.50 *** 68.401 ***



































Log of MTCTP coverage (2005)
Prepaid plans as % of private 
expenditure on health 








Log of HAART coverage (2006)
Share of GDP spent on     health 
(%)
Births attended by skilled health 
personnel (%)
 
Note: robust standard errors are in italics below the coefficients;  *,**,*** stand for significance at the 10%,5% 
and 1% level respectively; regression constants are not reported.  
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Instrumental variable estimates like the estimates in the second-stage regressions 
in Table 3 are consistent. They are, however, not unbiased in small samples. 
With sample sizes of 82 and 55 in the HAART and MTCTP regressions 
respectively, this small sample bias may cast a shadow of doubt over the test 
results. Furthermore, the bias in instrumental variable estimation increases with 
decreasing strength of the instrument (Hahn & Hausman 2005). High R2s and 
significance levels of the instruments in the first-stage regressions of Table 3 
indicate that the Muslim dummy and the adult literacy rate are strong 
instruments. The same is not true for the share of prepaid plans variable, which 
fails to be significant at the 10% level as a predictor of the share of GDP spent 
on health over the MTCTP sample.    
 
Instrumental variable estimators are also less efficient than their OLS 
counterparts. As a result one is more likely to wrongly accept the null hypothesis 
that a slope coefficient is not significantly different from zero. In light of the 
lack of efficiency and the potential bias originating from a weak instrument and 
a small sample, it is possible that the Hausman test for the three variables fails to 
identify an endogeneigty problem even though it exists. The regression results 
that follow should thus be interpreted with caution and a healthy suspicion of 
endogeneigty. 
 
Nevertheless, this section has presented an argument in which no conclusive 
proof, but some evidence against the presence of endogeneigty was provided. In 
the light of the lower efficiency and small sample bias of the instrumental 
variable estimators and in the absence of evidence for the presence of 
endogeneigty the next section employs standard OLS estimation as opposed to 
instrumental variable estimation.   
 
 
6. Results of the regression analysis  
 
 
6.1 Estimation technique 
 
This section looks at the results of various cross-country regressions of HAART 
and MTCTP coverage on their hypothesized determinants. The sample for the 
HAART coverage regressions consists of 82 countries, while there are only 54 
countries over which the MTCTP coverage regressions are run. In both cases the 
sample size is constrained by the availability of data and an exclusion criteria 
(following Nattrass 2006) that holds that a country’s adult HIV prevalence has 
to be 0.1% or above. The rationale behind this restriction is that it excludes 
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countries in which the HIV/AIDS epidemic is not big enough a problem to 
warrant the special attention of the national government or international 
organizations.  
 
The regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares. As with all 
applications of OLS estimation to cross-sectional data, heteroscedasticity (i.e. 
the variance of the error term being non-constant) may be a problem. 
Heteroscedasticity results in OLS estimators that are no longer efficient, which 
entails deflated t-statistics and the increased risk of wrongfully diagnosing a 
particular slope coefficient as insignificant. I use robust standard errors, which 
explicitly take into account the unequal variance of the error term, to avoid the 
pitfalls of heteroscedasticity.  
 
A final qualification is in order: As the regressions are likely to contain 
important omitted variables (for example, the share of political will not captured 
by the explanatory variables and the price a particular country pays for ARVs) 
the estimated slope coefficients may vary from their exact ‘true’ values. While 
this does not void the qualitative insights of the regressions that follow, this 
study should be regarded as exploratory and we should be wary of using the 
slope coefficients for predictive purposes. 
        
 
6.2 The determinants of HAART coverage 
 
In Regression 1 in Table 4 the log of HAART coverage is regressed on five 
explanatory variables. A high adult HIV prevalence, a high proportion of HIV 
positive people in urban areas, a large GDP per capita and a big share of GDP 
spent on health are all associated with significantly higher levels of HAART 
coverage. As indicated by the three stars, the slope coefficients for the 
proportion of HIV positive people in urban areas and the share of GDP spent on 
health are significant at the 1% level (i.e. in saying that these coefficients are 
statistically different from zero we are wrong less than 1% of the time). The 
percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel is not revealed to have 
a significant impact on HAART coverage. 
 
Regression 2 includes the PEPFAR and Global Fund dollars spent per capita. 
The PEPFAR dollars per capita seem to be associated with higher HAART 
coverage, although the variable only achieves significance at the 10% level. The 
Global Fund HIV-related aid per capita is not revealed to have a significant 
impact. However, the impact of such international support may well be greater 
than indicated by these results. There exists a selection bias in these two 
variables because international aid organizations and bilateral donors are likely 
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to lend their support to countries in particularly dire circumstances. Therefore, 
because of a propensity for selecting countries which face the largest obstacles 
to the use of ARVs, donors may not be revealed to have as large a positive effect 
on ARV coverage as they do in reality, unless the regression controls for all of 
the relevant obstacles.  
 
Once the international aid variables are added, the adult prevalence rate loses 
significance and its coefficient decreases. This is probably because PEPFAR and 
Global Fund tend to target countries with high prevalence rates and before the 
two variables were added, the prevalence rate captured some of the effect of the 
PEPFAR and Global Fund dollars on HAART coverage.  
 
In Regression 3, I add six political variables to the regression model. Only 
whether a country is an established democracy has a significant positive effect 
on HAART coverage. Electoral accountability, freedom of the press and 
political stability are all closely related to, if not features of democracy. The fact 
that these three political variables also used by Bor (2007) fail to come out 
significantly in Regression 3 may be taken as evidence that it is their meta 
institution, namely democracy, rather than electoral accountability, freedom of 
the press and political stability per se that matters. Accordingly, it may be 
regarded as troublesome that Bor fails to control for whether a country is a 
democracy or not in his regression analysis.  
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Table 4: The determinants of HAART coverage (2006) 
Dependent variable: Log of HAART coverage (2006)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent variables:
Log of adult HIV prevalence 0.15 ** 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.17 * 0.21
0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.22
0.99 *** 1.16 *** 0.94 ** 1.04 *** 0.80 ** 1.80 ***
0.31 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.56
Log of GDP per capita 0.29 * 0.23 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.19
0.15 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.21
0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.11 ** 0.14 *** 0.12 *** 0.18 ***
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06
0.0037 0.0037 0.0016 0.0020 0.0057 -0.0055
0.0058 0.0059 0.0058 0.0060 0.0051 0.0075
PEPFAR dollars per capita 0.0027 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0022 ** 0.0036 ***
0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.0009 0.0010
Global Fund (HIV) dollars per capita 0.022 0.018 0.024 * 0.024 ** 0.030 **
0.015 0.014 0.013 0.010 0.012
Established democracy 0.48 ** 0.46 ** 0.11 0.45











Log of non-AIDS DALYs per capita -0.42 -0.17 0.36
0.29 0.24 0.40
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.51 *
0.30
East, south and South-East Asia -0.08
0.38
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -0.80 **
0.37
Southern Africa mega epidemics -0.40 -0.30
0.28 0.37
Constant -0.83 -0.50 1.11 0.90 0.46 -0.08
0.99 1.02 1.59 1.19 1.11 1.40
R2 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.62 0.72
F-statistic 9.05 *** 20.24 *** 9.54 *** 13.60 *** 11.84 *** 8.65 ***
Observations (N) 82 82 79 82 82 37
SSA
Share of GDP spent on health (%)
Births attended by skilled health 
personnel (%)




Note:  Robust standard errors are in italics below the coefficients;  *,**,*** stand for 




The fact that cultural fractionalization fails to be a significant predictor of 
HAART coverage provides evidence against the importance Lieberman (2007) 
places on this variable in explaining AIDS-related policy outcomes. The 
substantial decrease in the GDP per capita’s coefficient, and the fact that this 
variable is no longer significant once the political variables are entered, is likely 
to be the result of a country’s GDP being a function of the democracy variable 
(for an example of arguments linking democracy to higher per capita incomes 
see Rodrik, 2000).  
 
Regression 4 includes the non-AIDS DALYs per capita. While this variable has 
the hypothesized negative slope coefficient, its fails to be statistically 
significant. However, on inclusion of the non-AIDS related DALYs, the Global 
Fund variable achieves significance. This makes sense in light of the Global 
Fund’s focus on countries with severe health crises. And this result also supports 
the premise that the international donors tend to be biased in that they select aid 
recipients that find themselves in the worst circumstances.                                                        
 
Regression 5 represents the best or most complete model of HAART coverage. 
It contains the regional dummy variables. The R2 indicates that 62% in the 
cross-country variation of HAART coverage is explained by the variation in the 
set of explanatory variables. On average, HAART coverage is revealed to be 
significantly higher in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and 
significantly lower in countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The other 
explanatory variables cannot account for these regional differences.  
 
Nattrass (2006) and Lieberman (2007) also find that countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean are associated with significantly higher HAART coverage. 
Part of the explanation could be that epidemics in Latin America and the 
Caribbean disproportionately affect concentrated groups, especially gay men 
(Parker 2000). Mobilisation by middle-class, predominantly urban gay men may 
well account for additional pressure on governments to provide treatment. 
Another explanation may be that the early and significant treatment response to 
the AIDS epidemic exhibited by the Brazilian government yielded a 
demonstration effect and lower ARV prices throughout the region. 
 
Once the regional dummy variables are added, the democracy dummy no longer 
achieves significance. This is probably because it proxied for the regional 
dummies in their absence. More specifically, most countries from Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the sample are established democracies, while the countries 
from Eastern Europe and Central Asia are not. It is striking that neither the GDP 
per capita nor the births attended by skilled health personnel are significant in 
Regression 5. However, in the case of births attended by skilled health personnel 
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the insignificant result should be interpreted with caution because the data 
quality is called into question by differences in the date of collection of the data 
across countries. 
 
What can be said about the relative size of the effects the significant variables 
have on HAART coverage in Regression 5? To answer this question it is helpful 
to look at a specific example. Uganda has a population of roughly 27 million 
people and a HAART coverage of 41%. The proportion of HIV positive 
Ugandans living in urban areas is 0.3. The model in Regression 5 estimates the 
effect of a one unit increase of the proportion of HIV positive people living in 
urban areas on HAART coverage to be 66%. This means that if the urban 
proportion of HIV positive people in Uganda would be 0.4, the country’s 
HAART coverage would be 6.6% higher, at a level of 43.7. If the percentage 
share of GDP spent on health in Uganda were to rise from its current level of 7.6 
to 8.6, HAART coverage is estimated to increase from 41 to 45.5. 
 
The coefficients of the significant international aid variables indicate that the 
effect of a Global Fund dollar per capita far exceeds that of a PEPFAR dollar. 
However, since PEPFAR provides more money to fewer countries the absolute 
effect of PEPFAR aid on an individual country is likely to be bigger. Suppose 
for a moment that the model can be used to predict the future. Then, if PEPFAR 
were to match its past disbursements to Uganda by committing another 3.5 
billion US dollars to the country, Uganda’s HAART coverage is predicted to 
rise 29 percent from 41% to 53%. If the Global Fund were to match its 34 
million US dollars of past disbursements to Uganda, the country’s HAART 
coverage would increase by 3%.  
 
Note that the data measures the total PEPFAR and Global Fund dollars 
disbursed to a country, which includes the money spent on all AIDS related 
initiatives including education and prevention. The money spent on treatment 
required to bring about the changes in HAART coverage hypothesized above is 
thus much lower. In reality, the model cannot hope to make accurate predictions 
of the future. Instead, these hypothetical figures are merely meant to illustrate 
the important role played by international donors in rolling out ARVs.    
 
In Regression 6 the empirical model is run over a sample of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. All significant variables in Regression 5 remain significant and 
preserve their signs. Since excluding all countries outside sub-Saharan Africa 
shrinks the number of observations to 37, the regression’s results should be 
interpreted with due caution. Nevertheless, they provide some evidence for the 
robustness of the model.    
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6.3 The determinants of MTCTP coverage 
 
Table 5 contains the results of six regression models describing the log of 
MTCTP coverage. In Regression 1, all five variables included in the model have 
a significant positive relationship with MTCTP coverage, even though GDP per 
capita only achieves significance at the 10% level. A one unit increase in the 
percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel is revealed to increase 
MTCTP coverage by 2%. The effect of an improvement in a country’s health 
system coverage as proxied for by the births attended by skilled personnel is 
thus likely to be sizable. However, the poor quality of the data that makes up 
this variable should caution the interpretation of this significant result just as it 
cautioned the interpretation of the insignificant result in the HAART 
regressions. 
 
In Regression 2 the PEPFAR and Global Fund dollars spent per capita are 
added to the model. Both are revealed to have a positive effect, but only achieve 
significance at the 10% level. The coefficients on the two variables are bigger 
than in the HAART regressions. This is probably because MTCTP is cheaper to 
administer and hence, a dollar of international aid can be expected to go further.  
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Table 5: The determinants of MTCTP coverage (2005) 
Dependent variable: Log of MTCTP coverage (2005)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent variables:
Log of adult HIV prevalence 0.28 *** 0.14 0.22 * 0.25 ** 0.33 ** 0.33
0.09 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.20
1.19 ** 1.29 ** 1.19 ** 1.16 ** 0.84 0.74
0.48 0.49 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.81
Log of GDP per capita 0.33 * 0.18 -0.02 -0.10 -0.36 -0.53
0.19 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.28
0.19 ** 0.18 *** 0.14 ** 0.15 ** 0.10 0.10
0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09
0.020 *** 0.022 *** 0.024 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.017 *
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.009
PEPFAR dollars per capita 0.0041 * 0.0032 0.0035 * 0.0048 ** 0.0056 ***
0.0021 0.0022 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018
Global Fund (HIV) dollars per capita 0.034 * 0.026 0.010 0.023 0.032
0.020 0.028 0.024 0.024 0.027
Established democracy 0.01
0.43
State legitimacy 1.08 ** 0.62 ** 0.26 0.35









Log of non-AIDS DALYs per capita -0.56 -0.64 * -0.79 *
0.41 0.34 0.41
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.13 **
0.43
East, South and South-East Asia 0.36
0.32
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2.44 ***
0.40
Southern Africa mega epidemics 0.03 0.05
0.42 0.44
Constant -3.82 *** -2.84 ** -1.21 -1.27 0.78 2.12
1.16 1.29 1.64 1.59 1.51 1.77
R2 0.59 0.62 0.69 0.68 0.78 0.70
F-statistic 18.03 *** 16.83 *** 10.55 *** 17.71 *** 71.13 *** 13.87 ***
Observations (N) 55 55 53 55 55 36
SSA
Share of GDP spent on health (%)
Births attended by skilled health 
personnel (%)




Note:  Robust standard errors are in italics below the coefficients;  *,**,*** stand for 
significance at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively.  
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In Regression 3 a legitimate state is revealed to achieve MTCTP coverage that is 
on average 108% higher than the coverage achieved by a non-legitimate state. It 
may be argued that investing in a country’s children (i.e. providing MTCTP) is a 
prime example of a developmental policy. Then, in regard to the previously 
established link between state legitimacy and the propensity of a government to 
engage in developmental policies, the revealed relationship is not surprising. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, however, whether a country is an established 
democracy or not does not seem to matter. Again, none of the political variables 
proposed by Bor (2007) and Lieberman (2007) are significant.  
 
The non-AIDS DALYs have a negative coefficient but do not achieve 
significance in Regression 4. On adding this variable, the coefficient of the state 
legitimacy dummy decreases substantially. This may be the reflection of 
legitimate states doing a better job of subverting health crises than non-
legitimate states. 
 
Regression 5 adds the regional dummy variables and represents the best model 
of MTCTP coverage. The R2 of 0.78 is very high. The regional dummies reveal 
that even once the other explanatory variables are controlled for, countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe and Central Asia seem to 
be much more successful in rolling out ARVs for MTCTP than countries in 
other regions of the world.  
 
The proportion of HIV positive people in urban areas, the GDP per capita, the 
share of GDP spent on health and state legitimacy were significant in previous 
regressions, but are no longer significant in Regression 5. Compared to HAART 
coverage, it is plausible that the concentration of people in need of MTCTP and 
health care professionals in urban areas matters less because MTCTP is easier to 
administer. Because MTCTP is also much cheaper to administer than HAART it 
is plausible that the share of the resources a society commits to health care is 
less consequential. 
 
PEPFAR money makes a significant and sizable contribution to MTCTP 
coverage. Global Fund money is not revealed to have an impact on MTCTP 
coverage. Possible explanations for this are the selection bias mentioned earlier; 
the fact that MTCTP is cheaper and easier to administer than HAART and 
countries would have been able to introduce it without outside assistance; or that 
the Global Fund prefers committing money to interventions other than MTCTP.  
 
The adult HIV prevalence rate and the percentage of births attended by skilled 
health personnel are associated with significantly higher levels of MTCTP 
coverage. Furthermore, the incident of other health crises measured by the non-
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AIDS DALYs negatively impacts on MTCTP coverage. Even though this 
variable is only significant at the 10% level, its large negative coefficient 
indicates that the opportunity costs in terms of health of committing one dollar 
to MTCTP matters substantially.  
 
Regression 6 tests the robustness of the model applied to countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. All variables maintain their signs. The adult HIV prevalence is 
no longer significant. The effects of births attended by skilled personnel, 
PEPFAR dollars and the non-AIDS DALYs remain significant, even though the 
births attended by skilled personnel only achieves significance at the 10% level. 
The model can explain much of the variation in MTCTP coverage across 





Regression analysis can establish that variables are statistically correlated; in 
combination with theoretical links between variables it can also provide some 
support for arguments posing causal connections between the dependent and 
independent variables. The regressions presented here provide support for the 
hypothesis that, holding other things equal, a high HIV prevalence rate 
positively impacts on ARV coverage, probably because AIDS is more likely to 
be a national priority in high prevalence countries. HAART coverage is also 
higher in countries that experience a concentration of the epidemic in urban 
areas. This is probably because it is easier to target people in need of HAART if 
they are in close proximity to the majority of health professionals. 
 
Neither GDP per capita nor the share of GDP spent on health are revealed to 
have an effect on MTCTP coverage. The regression analysis also does not 
indicate a positive effect of GDP per capita on HAART coverage. A society’s 
willingness to commit resources to health over other uses as measured by the 
share of GDP spent on health, however, is associated with higher levels of 
HAART coverage. This is an important result since we are dealing with a 
variable that government has some control over and can hope to affect in the 
short-run. It has to be noted though that the effect of these economic variables 
on ARV coverage was estimated in the absence of a variable that captures the 
price of ARVs in different countries. If price data were available, including a 
price variable in the analysis would increase the strength of conclusions 
regarding the effect of the economic variables on ARV coverage. 
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MTCTP coverage is positively affected by the percentage of births attended by 
qualified health personnel. It is negatively affected by the incidence of other 
health crises as measured by the non-AIDS related DALYs.  
 
On average, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean achieve higher 
HAART and MTCTP coverage. Countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
achieve lower HAART coverage and substantially higher MTCTP coverage than 
other countries even once a host of explanatory variables are controlled for. The 
fact that countries in this region are very successful in rolling out ARVs for 
MTCTP indicates that they have a good health infrastructure in place. These 
countries’ failure to roll out HAART may thus potentially be the result of a 
political choice rather than a lack of capacity. A more focused comparative 
study of the determinants of HAART coverage in Latin America and the 
Caribbean on the on hand, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia on the other 
hand, is likely to reveal valuable insights into the role played by political will in 
rolling out ARVs and to what extent this political will is shaped by the context 
in which government officials make decisions.    
 
The positive coefficients of the PEPFAR and Global Fund variables are highly 
topical. On April 2 of 2008, the United States House of Representatives passed a 
bill that commits another 50 billion dollars to the fight against AIDS over the 
next five years. More than the current 15 PEPFAR focus countries will be 
targeted in this initiative. The results of the regression analysis imply that this 
aid money is likely to go a long way in achieving greater ARV coverage in the 
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